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Guaranteeing conflict free diamonds: From compliance to norm expansion
under the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme

Anne Pitsch Santiago*
University of Portland, Oregon, USA
ABSTRACT
This study addresses compliance and business practices at the local level subsequent to the
international adoption of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme by states and the
adoption of the voluntary System of Warranties by the diamond industry. This paper also
explores the distance between norm creation, norm sustainability, and norm expansion.
Interests of various stakeholders led to the creation of international norms, and evidence
supports widespread compliance at the state level. Data gathered at the local level of
retailer suggests, however, that the regulatory system is not leading to the education of
consumers that potentially transforms beliefs. Central to understanding the challenge of
deepening and broadening new global norms is exploring the distance between compliance
within the regulatory regime and the awareness or change of beliefs of stakeholders.
Recommendations include steps to make the process of bringing diamonds to market
transparent and available to public scrutiny.

INTRODUCTION
*santiago@up.edu

Over the past dozen years, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which is
legally binding on member states, has been in place to prevent diamonds potentially used to fund
conflict from entering consumer markets. Assessing the success of the process and evaluating the
model of self-monitoring in the diamond industry has been on the agenda of the World Diamond
Council, an organisation whose purpose is to represent industry interests in the development of
norms and regulations following from the KPCS regulatory regime, and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs).1 A number of excellent studies have detailed how the KPCS evolved,2
how effective it has been in fulfilling its goals,3 and the significance of the scheme in terms of
providing a model of ethical business practice within the extractive resource sector.4 In addition,
there have been several reports, especially within the NGO sector, that critically analyse the state
adopted and legally binding KPCS and the diamond industry designed and voluntary System of
Warranties5 to provide suggestions for improvements to the regulatory process.6 Mostly, these
assessments have been carried out at the state level: assessing the annual meetings of the KPCS
members and the effectiveness of the state actors in adhering to KPCS rules. This method
focuses primarily on the rules and procedures of the KPCS that states are obligated to follow to
retain membership. Another body of research analyses the endurance of the KPCS over time by
examining the roles different stakeholders have played in shaping and monitoring the KPCS
since its inception.7 This research builds on these studies to pursue two additional questions.
First, how do we explain the durability of the KPCS as a self-regulating system? Second, given
this endurance and the adoption of the industry’s complimentary voluntary standards known as
the System of Warranties (SoW), how do retailers understand their obligations under the
regulatory system and how do they convey this understanding to consumers? Finally, the
findings from these micro- and macro-level analyses can also provide insights for better

understanding global governance regimes overseeing extractive industries. This study concludes
that despite the self-regulatory nature of the KPCS, it is likely to endure because the very identity
of the diamond industry has changed through the development of corporate social responsibility
norms within the KPCS framework. At the same time, several additional steps are needed in
order for the industry to be able to claim that it truly ethically sources its diamonds.

Framing the analysis of KPCS endurance, compliance, and impacts on the diamond
industry
Though states remain the most powerful actors in the international system, multinational
enterprises (MNEs) and NGOs can also have influence over global governance processes. A
growing body of literature attests that corporations are increasingly expected to be ‘good
citizens’ within the international system and contribute to global governance in a variety of
ways. 8 This is evidenced by the establishment of the KPCS as a self-regulating oversight
mechanism of the diamond industry.9 Philipp Pattberg distinguished between three approaches to
understanding the formation of regimes to govern transnational problems: power-based
explanations, interest-based explanations, and knowledge-based explanations. 10 Power-based
explanations focus on how both monetary and non-monetary power resources influence
cooperation, while interest-based explanations analyse how stakeholders coordinate their actions
to bring about mutual gains, and knowledge-based arguments emphasise the importance of ideas
and identity formation.11 Elements from each of these approaches can help us identify why the
KPCS has endured after a dozen years, especially given both the absence of high-profile
conflicts that involve extraction of diamonds to fuel the fighting and limited local-level (retailer)

education from retailers about their compliance with industry standards governing production
across the diamond value chain.
The KPCS is a self-governing system. It entered into force in 2003 and state members are
obligated to adhere to minimum standards as well as to adopt national legislation and institutions
to ensure compliance. It is unique within the world of transnational governance regimes in that it
was established through cooperation between industry actors, states, and NGOs who each saw
their interests advanced through adoption of a self-governing system to regulate diamonds.12 In
utilising a power-based explanation to understand the endurance of the KPCS, one can point to
the approximately $71 billion dollar annual retail sales of the diamond industry,13 the investment
of resources in the regulatory process, including the creation of the World Diamond Council,14
and the extensive marketing campaign by the industry to become the leader in protecting
consumers from purchasing conflict diamonds. With the extensive monetary stake that the
diamond industry has in promoting its diamonds as symbols of love, and untainted by conflict, it
is not surprising that the KPCS has endured, nor that the industry has adopted the voluntary SoW
to further protect its retailers from the possibility of handling conflict-tainted stones. The
regulatory process has become entrenched within the industry and has become self-reinforcing.
KPCS member states have implemented national legislation that further supports KPCS goals.
As Ronit and Scheinder observe, ‘strong state and private regulatory regimes tend to be
compatible with one another rather than contradictory.’ 15 This complementarity of state and
private regulations is also a power-based explanation for the endurance of the KPCS.
The very process through which the KCPS was born supports an interest-based
explanation focusing on stakeholder coordination to achieve mutual gains. Conflict diamonds
were the concern of two small NGOs, Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness, and the

United Nations before they became a concern of the diamond industry, but the regulation of the
diamond industry would not have come to fruition without the coordinated efforts of the
diamond industry and states in cooperation with the NGOs. 16 Because all the stakeholders
eventually became convinced that a regulatory process was necessary to ensure their individual
interests, the KCPS was implemented. The endurance of the KCPS can also be explained in
terms of self-interest, though we have seen in recent years the erosion of the cooperation between
industry actors and some NGO actors. For example, in December 2011, Global Witness
withdrew its participation in the KPCS review process arguing that ‘the scheme’s main flaws and
loopholes have not been fixed and most of the governments that run the scheme continue to show
no interest in reform.’

17

Thus, though the interest-based explanation is important to

understanding the origins of the KCPS, it may not be as useful for understanding its endurance.
Still, states and the diamond industry remain convinced that it is in their own interests to
maintain the structure. For example, at the 8th Annual World Diamond Council’s Meeting in
Vicenza Italy, speakers ranging from the WDC president Eli Izhakoff to US Ambassador Gillian
Milovanovic to South Africa’s Minister of Mineral Resources Susan Shabangu reiterated the
need for the KPCS and for reassessment of the system to ensure that diamonds remain ethically
sourced.18
It is perhaps in approaching the KPCS from a knowledge-based perspective that we can
best explain its endurance over time. Both Virginia Haufler and Carola Kantz utilise this
approach to explain the development of norms governing the trade in diamonds globally.19 These
norms have become embedded within the diamond industry itself, and its identity has been
shaped by these norms. As Matthias Hoffenberth et al. suggest, ‘the norms an actor accepts and
chooses to adhere to define what he or she is and what others see in him or her. Norms allow

[stakeholders] to interpret action as appropriate or inappropriate and therefore constitute new
identities.’20 Indeed, in some ways, the diamond industry, in establishing the World Diamond
Council, has taken over the role of consumer protector, advocate, and agenda setter from the
NGOs who played this role initially. For example, beginning with the controversy over
Zimbabwe’s Marange mines and the decision of the KPCS in 2011 to keep Zimbabwe within its
membership ranks, the momentum to address a broader agenda beyond ‘conflict diamonds’ has
grown. Critical for several years about the KPCS’s limitations, Global Witness pulled out from
the process after the decision to allow Zimbabwe to export diamonds from the Marange fields
where there had been widespread reports of human rights abuses.21 Yet, technically the situation
in Zimbabwe does not violate the terms of the KPCS because ‘conflict diamonds’ are defined as:
…rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at
undermining legitimate governments [emphasis added] as described in relevant United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or in other
similar UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the future, and as understood and
recognized in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in
other similar UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in future.22
Because of this narrow definition of conflict diamonds, former KPCS Chair and Namibian
Deputy Minister of Mines Bernard Esau asserted that ‘[t]he Kimberley Process is not a human
rights organization.’23 Still, the NGO community has advanced a broader conceptualisation of
the obligations of states and industry actors to source their diamonds not only from zones free of
narrowly defined conflicts, but much more broadly, to ethically source them. Because the
identity of the diamond industry itself is tied to the norms associated with the KPCS and
voluntary SoW, industry stakeholders themselves have begun to push for more expansive ethical
standards related to the diamond industry. It is because the diamond industry has adopted this
role for itself that it is important to focus on how well not only the KPCS has endured but also

how faithfully the industry adheres to the voluntary SoW if we want to assess the ‘success’ of
the regime governing diamond sales.

Survey and content analysis of diamond retailers
Arguably, one indicator of the success of the governing regime is that retailers believe they can
guarantee their diamonds ‘conflict free’ through the supply chain from mine to storefront.
Because the KPCS governs only the trade in rough diamonds, the obligations at the retail level
fall under the voluntary SoW, while the state signatories of the KPCS are bound by its statutes.
Yet, because it is in the interest of the diamond industry to be able to claim they ethically source
and market diamonds from mine to storefront, but also because the general public is more likely
to have heard from the KPCS rather than the SoW, examining retailer knowledge of both the
KPCS and the SoW is justified. Hence, this study asks how do retailers frame their obligations
and compliance under the KPCS and the voluntary SoW for consumers? After conducting
interviews with diamond retailers and analysing a wide variety of retailer websites, the basic
answer to the stated question is that the majority of retailers do not frame their obligations under
the KPCS and SoW at all. This lack of transparency on the part of the retailers indicates a
gap between KPCS compliance and norm development and embeddedness within the
regulatory framework that can lead to the transformation of consumer beliefs and trust in
the process by observers. The diamond industry has relied on the KPCS and SoW to advance
their credibility as an ethical industry, but if retailers are lacking in transparency, then
consumers, and perhaps more importantly NGO observers, may remain sceptical that selfregulation is the answer to the problem of ‘conflict’ or ‘illicit 24’ diamonds. Indeed, Amnesty
International and Global Witness carried out an investigation in 2004 into retailer reporting on

their obligations under the KPCS and System of Warranties and were alarmed by their lack of
transparency. 25 This was at a time of heightened awareness of the problem of ‘conflict
diamonds’, yet the NGOs concluded that the industry’s approach to self-monitoring was not
adequate.26 The multiple stakeholders within the diamond industry have risked their reputations
on this oversight process and in the words of Kantz, ‘maximize[d] their discursive power’ in
order to maintain the narrative that diamonds are a symbol of love, not a driving force for
conflict.27
Given the importance of the extensive oversight efforts within the diamond industry, we
expect diamond retailers, as major stakeholders in the process, both to understand their
obligations under the KPCS and SoW and to be able to articulate them to their customers. This
proposition was tested through a survey of diamond retailers in Portland, Oregon28 and a content
analysis of diamond retailer websites. Three hypotheses were examined. First, if the diamond
industry has diligently engaged in educating its retailers and trade associations, then the vast
majority of retailers surveyed would have knowledge of the KPCS, the SoW, and their
obligations under these processes, and be able to articulate them. The second hypothesis is that a
majority of retailers, at least 75%, are willing to engage in a conversation about the regulatory
regime in the interest of ensuring the surveyor that the retailer is following its obligations under
the SoW. This is expected because the World Diamond Council and the Jewelers of America
have encouraged their members to respond to any public inquiries about conflict diamonds.29
The final hypothesis is that the vast majority (75%) of retailers who have an online presence
have included information on their websites related to where their diamonds originate, at the
very minimum, or specifically related to their obligations under the regulatory framework
(including information about the KPCS or SoW).

The approach to gaining information on jewellery retailers involved two populations:
jewellers selling diamonds in the city of Portland, OR and diamond jewellers’ websites randomly
selected from Google searches. The population 30 of 105 retail jewellers in Portland was
contacted via telephone and asked to participate in a survey related to their practices regarding
the purchase of diamonds and their knowledge of their obligations under the regulatory regime
governing diamonds. In addition, a content analysis was conducted for each of the 105 retailers
that had websites to assess the availability and type of information displayed about the KPCS
and System of Warranties.
Of the 105 jewellers in Portland that made up the sample, about 40 were eliminated due
to inaccessibility, reducing the viable cases to 61. Of these, 45 managers declined to participate
in the survey. The 16 completed surveys represent only 26% of the 61 viable cases. This is well
below the expected 75% of retailers hypothesised to participate. Of these 61 that were contacted,
39 (64%) had websites, 17 of which (44% of those with websites) had information related to the
Kimberley Process or diamond origins on their websites. For most websites, in order to find the
information, an extensive search of the website was required. Some websites included
information under education about diamonds while others under frequently asked questions or
policies. There was no consistency in placement of information on the regulatory process on
jewellers’ websites, nor consistency regarding the information provided.
Those managers who willingly participated in the survey were asked three categories of
questions. One category related to the characteristics of the business. Another category related to
the store policies about diamond origins. A third category asked questions about their customers
and the Portland jewellry market itself. The managers who agreed to complete the survey had
between 3 and 60 years in the jewellry business, and the stores that they managed had existed

between 2 and 175 years. Store employees ranged from 0 to 20, and 13 of the 16 stores were
independent while 3 were part of a larger chain. When asked whether the store was a member of
a trade association of any kind, three said no, one did not answer, two did not know, and ten
answered in the affirmative. The most common trade associations that the managers were aware
of were the Jewelers Board of Trade, and the Gem Society of America, neither of which is
dedicated to the regulatory process. The Jewelers Board of Trade advances the interests of
retailers while the Gem Society of America guarantees the quality of gems sold. One retailer was
a member of the Jewelers Vigilance Committee and two were members of the Jewelers of
America. Both of these organisations do have commitments under the SoW. Thirteen of the
sixteen did have policies on explaining the sourcing of their diamonds, and of these, all had the
policy available for customers. The managers had limited information on their customers to
share. Only two managers said the stores were keeping track of customers concerned about
diamond origins for their own purposes, and they did not share this data. Trying to assess
consumer preferences from what managers observe is not the best approach, however, and an
additional study directed at diamond consumers could be beneficial. Through a study targeting
consumers, one could test the logical conclusion from the present study that there is limited
concern amongst diamond consumers about the ethical sourcing of diamonds. This conclusion is
based on the observation that retailers have little sales incentive to share information about this
very topic with consumers, who seem unaware of the bigger issues at stake with every diamond
purchase.

Data from online diamond retailers

Because of the growing presence of online diamond retailers, the second level of analysis
conducted was to randomly generate a list of diamond retailers with an online presence.31 A total
of 108 different websites were coded for a variety of variables related to whether or not the
website had information available about the KPCS, the voluntary SoW, or conflict diamonds
broadly. The availability and ease of online shopping for diamonds may pose a challenge to the
regulatory framework. Many of these retailers advertised both loose diamonds and diamond
jewellry, so whether or not they adhere to the KPCS and voluntary SoW is a pressing question.
The hypotheses for this portion of the research were the following:


H1: At least 75% of the websites would have information available to consumers
regarding their obligations under the KPCS and/or System of Warranties.



H2: At least 75% of websites would have information relating to ‘conflict diamonds’
and/or the origin of their diamonds.



H3: Online-only jewellers (those without a storefront) would be less likely to have
information available about the KPCS and/or System of Warranties and about conflict
diamonds generally.



H4: Those jewellers that were part of a national chain (e.g. Kay Jewellers) would be more
likely to have information about KPCS and/or System of Warranties and about conflict
diamonds, generally, than would those jewellers that are independent.

Of the 108 websites coded, 72 were online retailers who also had storefronts and 36 were
online only retailers. Figure 1 shows the results of the content analysis. For the online/storefront
retailers, 49 (68.1%) had no specific information on the KPCS, 59 (81.9%) had no information
specifically on the SoW, 64 (88.9%) had no diamond sourcing information and 45 (62.5%) had

no information specifically stating that their diamonds were ‘conflict free.’ For the online only
retailers, the percentages were similar. Of the 36 stores that were online-only retailers of
diamonds 23 (63.9%) had no specific information on the KPCS, 31 (86.1%) had no information
specifically on the SoW, 32 (88.9%) had no information on from where their diamonds
originated, and 21 (58.3%) had no information specifically stating that their diamonds were
‘conflict free.’

Figure 1: Online diamond retailers survey results
0.70
0.60

online-yes

0.50
0.40

online-no

0.30
0.20
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0.10
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Source: Author’s survey.
Notes: Percentages of online retailers (n=108) that include (yes) or do not include (no) information related
to the regulation of conflict diamonds, separated by whether the website represents an online only retailer
(online) or an online retailer that also has a storefront (online+store).

Chi-square tests were also conducted in order to assess whether or not there were actual
differences between several different types of retailers. The first question is whether there were
differences in what information was available on websites depending on whether the diamond
retailer was online only or had an online presence and also a physical store. The second question

is whether there was a difference in what information was available on websites depending on
whether or not the online presence was targeting a local consumer (i.e. existing in a single
location) or was targeting consumers across multiple markets (e.g. Zales that is a national chain
with stores across locations). Finally, a chi-square test was used to determine whether it mattered
that the store sold only finished jewellry, or sold jewellry and loose diamonds. The results of all
the tests comparing the different sub-sets of the sample showed that there was no significant
difference in what information was available on the websites regardless of whether they were
local retailers or national chains, whether they sold online only or had a storefront, or whether
they sold only finished jewellry or loose diamonds as well. These results show no statistically
significant difference between store types regarding the kind of information about the retailer’s
commitment to selling conflict free diamonds that is on the website. There are no specific
characteristics that one can point to that would lead to predictions regarding on which websites
one would find information about the KPCS, the SoW, or conflict diamonds.
From these basic analyses, it can be concluded that all the hypotheses stated were
rejected. Not only did the majority of websites have no information related to the KPCS, the
SoW, or conflict diamonds generally, there was also no difference between different subpopulations of the sample. In addition, the jewellry stores in Portland that had websites tended to
have more information on the KPCS and SoW (44%) than did online only retailers (36.1%) or
online/store retailers (31.9%) from elsewhere across the country. The broad conclusion to be
drawn from this analysis is that most websites that sell diamonds have no information about
where those diamonds come from, nor about how retailers guarantee that their diamonds are
ethically sourced.

What are the implications of this 2012 study of Portland Oregon and online diamond
retailers for furthering norm development and compliance within the regulatory regime? One
conclusion from these analyses is that diamond sourcing has introduced new practices in
terms of supply compliance, but it has not transformed the industry practices at the level of
the consumer and the retailer buying experience. This is supported by the evidence that
well over 60% of websites nationally had no information related to the KPCS, SoW, or conflict
diamonds. Understanding why retailers do not prioritise their commitment to provide proof
of compliance is likely complicated and beyond the scope of this study. However, this
analysis is a first step to identify a gap between compliance and advancing new norms.
How new international norms effectively transform beliefs and deepen behavioural change
is an important question with implications for the study of other international norms, from
environmental change to human rights.

This study identifies the gap in a way that

demands more research not just on the process of establishing new norms but also
research on the ways that norms become more deeply institutionalised with changing
beliefs. Many local retailers have yet to shift beyond the initial compliance to embrace the
opportunities and possibilities of transformative change through transparently displaying
their commitments under the SoW to all consumers.
Retailers participate in the process downstream from where the binding legislation
regarding conflict diamonds is applied. For example, the SoW that the Jewellers of America and
Jewellers Vigilance Committee adhere to as well as The Clean Diamond Trade Act, Public Law
108-19 of the 108th Congress, may lead retailers to conclude that conflict diamonds will be
stopped at the source rather than be allowed into the supply chain, and hence their obligations
under the SoW are fulfilled with limited vigilance required. From this, retailers may conclude

that it is not necessary to readily make available information about diamond sourcing. Yet
because this issue has been taken up and thoroughly embraced by the diamond industry itself,
one would hope that even at the retail level there would be vigilance in demonstrating that
diamond retailers continue to adhere to the rules put in place. Compliance is different from
interest-driven behaviour and different from the transformation of practices around the diamond
buying process for consumers. Retailers may find it important, and trust in the established
regulatory process to guarantee conflict free diamonds, but based on the foregoing observations,
they do not demonstrate any urgency to get across to their clients that this process is working.

Understanding the compliance gap: From local retailers to global governance
The Corporate Social Responsibility literature has expanded significantly over the past
two decades as the power and influence of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) 32 have grown.
These economic actors are valued for their capacity to create economic growth through creating
jobs, transferring technology skills and knowledge, and providing investment funds. However,
they are also heavily criticised for prioritising profits over people and for seeking to invest in
states that offer the fewest obstacles to big profits by offering the lowest wage workers, the least
oppressive tax obligations, and minimal health, safety and environmental standards.33 There is no
agreement regarding the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on either norm
development or profitability for corporations resulting from CSR campaigns. 34 Palacios
concludes, ‘[t]he crux of the matter is that no laws and no binding rules exist for regulating the
behaviour and international mobility of

corporate citizens similar to those in force for

individuals citizens, even though the former have rights and entitlements similar to the latter35.’
The development of the KPCS and the industry’s adoption of additional self-imposed oversight

obligations demonstrate that the diamond industry is highly conscious of its image and wants to
drive the process of setting the rules regarding ethically sourcing diamonds. However, from the
perspective of the NGOs who were at the forefront of initiating the attention to conflict diamonds
in the first place, the fundamental limitation of the regulatory process is precisely that it is
overseen by the industry itself and that if industry no longer sees it as profitable, then the
incentive to maintain the process disappears altogether. Yet, ten years after the KPCS has been
implemented, it is so embedded within the industry that it is likely to remain. Haufler points out,
for example, that one of the strengths of the KPCS is its ‘ability to evolve over time’ as new
challenges arise.36
As currently structured, the burden of proof for conflict free sourcing of diamonds falls
on the actors upstream in the chain of production, and the distance between compliance with the
KPCS and local level marketing of new standards or educating around the issues is an important
insight for international norms more generally. The KCPS in particular relies on buy-in from
stakeholders that its structure is adequate to catch most of the problems at the stage of mining
and transporting of raw diamonds. Yet, Haufler identifies the major flaw in the KPCS as the
problem of ‘spoilers’.37 And, because only raw diamonds are covered under the KPCS, there
may be opportunities along the supply chain for conflict, but more likely illicit, diamonds to be
introduced. Because of the embedded and enduring nature of the regulatory process, the KPCS
primarily and the voluntary SoW secondarily can mostly guarantee, given the risk of spoilers,
that diamonds are not coming from conflict zones. Bieri and Boli confirm that:
…we observe the expansion of CSR norms in terms of both breadth and depth: new
principles regarding ethical diamond trading, rooted in CSR logic, expanded to
previously unaffected market segments and, via tripartite negotiations, reached a
threshold of taken-for-grantedness that made the principles essentially obligatory for
companies and states engaged in the diamond trade.38

From this, we can conclude that the lack of knowledge or sharing of knowledge about the
process by the retailers is essentially unimportant from the perspective of how well the KPCS
regulatory regime is working. It is very important, however, from the perspective of image and
identity especially given the diamond industry’s own desire to show its commitment to ethically
sourcing diamonds and moving them through the supply chain. Because one of the main
arguments in favor of CSR logic applying in the case of the diamond industry is that the industry
must ethically source its diamonds to prevent an image catastrophe, one would expect that at the
level of retailer more information about the sourcing of diamonds would be available to
consumers and NGO watchdogs, but the evidence presented herein does not demonstrate this.
The gap between the compliance within the regulatory framework and the marketing of that
compliance to and education of the public has deepened the distrust of some observers while
leaving the diamond industry open to the accusation that its concerns for ethically sourcing
diamonds are at the level of talk rather than action.
Finally, there is a major disagreement between those who believe that self-regulatory
regimes are not self-sustaining – and therefore support the need for global governance systems –
and those who believe that there is little chance that legally binding regulations can be achieved
at the global level. Ruggie argues that:
[t]here is little chance of transnational firms becoming subject to legally binding
regulations at the global level any time soon; the political will or even capacity simply is
not there, and much of the corporate world would unite to fight it. In contrast, voluntary
initiatives over time may build an interest among leading firms for a more level playing
field vis-à-vis laggards, thereby realigning the political balance in the corporate sector.39
This seems to be the logic followed by the stakeholders in the KPCS. Without the sustained
attention to ethical diamond sourcing, as well as continued pressure to expand what this means
beyond diamonds from conflict zones staying out of the supply chain, standards could be relaxed

over time and the regulatory system eroded. And it is important to keep in mind that one of the
key factors in the decrease of ‘conflict diamonds’ in the supply chain over time is that several
major conflicts (Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia) driving the trade in diamonds from conflict zones
have ended. Because of the absence of these high profile conflicts in diamond producing states at
the present time, the KPCS and System of Warranties are not being tested seriously. As Haufler
states, ‘it is not entirely clear that these new forms [hybrid regulatory schemes involving
governments, NGOs, and corporations] are articulated well with the realities on the ground in the
most conflict-ridden cases.’40 Further, Palacio asserts that:
TNCs [Transnational Corporations] cannot become fully accountable and responsible
citizens, the same way as capitalism cannot be ‘caring’, although they can be induced to
embrace socially and environmentally desirable objectives. The possibility of
accomplishing such a task will ultimately depend on the balance that can be reached
between the factors that impede or facilitate it. The most visible roadblocks are multiple
and powerful. Above all is the condition of TNCs as entrepreneurial organizations whose
raison d’etre is to make profits for stakeholders and the derived fact that their behavior is
inherently guided by a cold business logic that responds to market imperatives. Profit
making will always have priority over equity or environmental protection objectives.
Likewise, corporations’ ubiquitous presence and sheer economic power and political
muscle associated with both allow them to further their interests and achieve their goals.41
The main NGOs overseeing KPCS compliance would like to see stronger regulatory processes in
place that are externally verified42, but that is unlikely to happen within the diamond industry any
time soon, both because of the opposition of state actors43 and also because the industry itself has
been so successful in both agenda-setting and norm development.
Yet, there should be concern about compliance with the process, especially given the
increase in online retailers. The majority (76.9%) of online retailers (83.3% of online-only
retailers) had nothing on their websites about belonging to industry associations like the Jewelers
of America or Jewelers Vigilance Committee. If the industry is relying on these associations to
ensure compliance with the voluntary SoW, the lack of full membership in these organisations

by online retailers calls into question their reliability in guaranteeing conflict diamonds do not
make their way to consumers. To ensure the confidence of the public stakeholders in the
regulatory process, remedies are needed at the retail level to make sure that consumers have
access to the necessary information about their diamonds’ origins.
At the same time, the fact that discussions over expanding the scope of the regulatory
regime to cover not only conflict zones, but also ‘illicit diamonds’, those from states with major
human rights violations, money laundering networks, or local level conflicts, demonstrates that
there is a gap between compliance within the regulatory process and norm development that
would ensure that the diamond industry is behaving ethically. Yet, there is evidence that the
diamond industry itself takes these roles as protector and agenda-setter seriously. In June 2012,
Eli Izhakoff, then-President of the World Diamond Council (WDC), delivered a speech to the
Intercessional Meeting of the KPCS that called for an expanded definition of ‘conflict
diamonds.’ The idea of expanding the definition addresses the human rights concerns of the
NGOs. President Izhakoff quoted Martin Luther King, Jr. when he elaborated on this proposal,
saying ‘[w]e empathise with others in the chain of distribution because it is what defines us as
moral human beings and business people. It is always possible to turn a quick profit without
considering the ethical consequences of our actions, but it is not necessarily good business. And
when I say ‘good’ I am speaking both ethically and economically.44’ Izhakoff further suggested
that broadening the definition of conflict diamonds should include diamonds associated with
‘diamond-related violence in rough diamond producing and trading areas. ’ He reiterated this
support for an expanded definition of conflict diamonds in his address at the WDC Annual
Meeting in May 2013.45 An expanded definition would imply that governments themselves could
be involved in violating the ethical principles related to the sale of rough diamonds. In explaining

why the KPCS needed an updated definition of ‘conflict diamonds,’ then-chairwoman
Ambassador Gillian Milovanovic of the US formulated her arguments in terms of ethics and
responsibility. Ambassador Milovanovic stated in her address at the 2012 Intercessional Meeting
of the KPCS:
We in the KP all bear a heavy responsibility for the millions of people -- artisanal
diggers and equipment operators at industrial mines, cutters, polishers, and retail
clerks -- who depend on diamonds for their livelihoods and for the countries
whose development relies in part on diamond revenues. The KP may be only one
factor impacting these jobs and revenues, but it is one that we have the capacity -and obligation -- to affect positively. Failure to change will yield negative effects
in contrast to the immediate and long term benefits an updated definition would
provide to the entire supply chain.46

The discussion of expanding the definition of conflict diamonds was taken up at the
November 2012 Plenary Meeting of the KCPS, but members did not reach any consensus on
changing the definition, nor by mid-2014 had an expanded definition yet been adopted by either
the KPCS nor the WDC. 47 Expanding the definition of conflict diamonds to include ‘illicit’
diamonds is an uphill battle mainly because several African diamond producing states are
particularly opposed to changing the definition. These African states have for some time been
reluctant to criticise the Mugabe government on a range of human rights abuses, though some
like Botswana have been critical of Mugabe’s extensive stay in office, even as many states
outside Africa have been very critical of that government’s violence towards its own people.48
African leaders have also been sensitive to the perception that external actors are trying to
impose norms of governance, or worse trying to punish African actors through international
regimes. In recent years, there has been a push by African leaders to play a larger role in solving
what are seen as African problems, but the problem of ethical sourcing of diamonds is a global,
not a regional, concern. There are some optimistic analysts who note that there may be further

developments yet regarding ‘best practices’ in diamond-producing regions that could help to
advance greater human rights and human security, as well as financial transparency and
economic development for greater numbers of people involved in mining.49
By taking a leading role in advancing discussions on expanding the definition of ‘conflict
diamonds,’ the diamond industry is attempting, at the very least rhetorically, to expand norm
developments within a global governance system. Hoffenberth et al. assert, ‘an analysis of
corporate rhetoric also bears implications for their actions…there is at least theoretical reason to
assume that the way an actor constructs his identity through rhetorical references tells us
something about the way he or she acts.’50 Expanding the scope of the regulatory process to
include not only ‘conflict’ but also ‘illicit’ diamonds would show renewed compliance to
industry commitments to ethically source their diamonds. While industries involved in global
enterprises find it increasingly difficult to evade social and public scrutiny, there is not
consistency across MNEs in how and when they promote ethical behaviour.51 Yet states,
especially in Africa, are more concerned with maintaining local control over the process as well
as over their economies. Still, there are weaknesses in the self-regulatory nature of the KPCS that
may erode it over time. For example, even if there are member states willing to implement an
expanded definition of ‘conflict diamonds’ or to critically assess the actions of their fellow
statesmen, the KPCS operates on consensus, making agreement on new actions especially
difficult. 52 Attention to the compliance gap that has been demonstrated gives us a better
understanding of the challenges of expanding norms within this established self-regulatory
system.

CONCLUSION

It is naïve to assume that all illicit diamonds can be kept out of the chain of production.
Diamonds are an easily lootable, easily transportable commodity, mined in places with porous
borders that bring very lucrative rewards to those who sell them.53 Yet, it is an exaggeration to
say regulation is impossible, or that the KPCS is not working. Still there are multiple flaws in
the process where improvements could be readily made. For example, all diamonds sold to
consumers should have certificates not only guaranteeing clarity and cut, but also conflict-free
sourcing, and there easily could be industry standards for websites on what information to
provide about where diamonds originate and the regulatory process that oversees ethical sourcing
of these gems. Many websites have information related to educating oneself about the four Cs to
look for when purchasing an diamond: cut, clarity, carats, and colour. Easily, a fifth C could be
added:

conflict-free sourcing. These processes should be implemented because there are

growing numbers of diamonds sold both online and in markets outside the ‘developed’
countries.54
From the perspective of norm expansion, one of the most promising developments in
recent years is the recognition that the definition of ‘conflict diamonds’ under the KPCS is too
narrow. In order for the industry to be taken seriously in its claims that it does ethically source
diamonds, it must move beyond the KPCS to better regulate diamonds that are illicitly mined and
moved through the value chain, either by, for example, forced labour or under a cloud of massive
human rights abuses as in Zimbabwe,55 or illegally utilised within money laundering schemes.
This will take the cooperation of state actors, which will pose a bigger obstacle than corporate
actors because states, especially one-party states where rulers are well-ensconsed like Zimbabwe,
and their parastatal mining firms are less sensitive to activist and consumer perceptions and are
further up the supply chain than other industry actors, most especially retailers, through which

diamonds pass as they move from mine to storefront. Additional measures to ensure compliance
would be needed. Thus the question arises: can the industry expand the definition of conflict
diamonds in such a way as to satisfy organisations like Global Witness while also retaining the
cooperation of governments who are themselves often the actors that violate human rights in
diamond-producing regions?
Tiffany’s could well be the gold standard for diamond jewellry retailers when it comes to
assuring the public of its commitment to ethically sourcing its diamonds. Tiffany’s has dedicated
itself to corporate responsibility on a number of fronts, not least of which is adhering to the
KPCS and voluntary SoW. On its website, it devotes multiple pages to the idea of corporate
responsibility, and on the page dedicated to ethical sourcing of diamonds, Tiffany’s explicitly
states from where its diamonds originate, who polishes them, and what guarantees are put in
place to ensure its customers that its diamonds are conflict free. Clearly Tiffany’s is in an elite
position few other diamond retailers shaare (e.g. they created their own polishing house and have
invested directly in certain mines), but the openness of their commitment to providing conflictfree diamonds could well be the model for other retailers whether they are international or local.
If the self-regulatory process within the diamond industry is to continue to keep the vast majority
of conflict diamonds, and more importantly illicit diamonds, out of the supply chain then
excellent cooperation amongst all stakeholders is needed, down to the local retailer.
The process of norm development has continued within the diamond industry with
cooperation amongst states, corporate actors, and NGOs, albeit with some limitations as noted
above. This process is likely to continue mainly because industry actors have so thoroughly
embraced their obligations as socially responsible actors through ‘mechanisms by which
normative frameworks become institutionalised in concrete social responsibility practices, that is,

the process that matches action to words.’ 56 The addition of local-level data helps us to
understand some of the remaining challenges of norm development for socially responsible
corporate actors, especially the gap between compliance within the regulatory framework and the
education of retailers and consumers about their responsibilities therein. Retailers need to be
better incorporated into the process of ensuring that diamonds are ethically sourced, and reflect
this involvement with information that is easily accessed on their websites and in their stores.
Consumers should be made aware of the KPCS and the retailer’s obligations under the voluntary
SoW. The more the process is transparent and available to public scrutiny, the more valid the
claims that the regulatory process really is keeping conflict diamonds, and hopefully soon illicit
diamonds, out of consumer hands. Closing the gap between compliance and consumer education,
especially through the expansion of norms, can only benefit industry actors and those employed
along the value chain from mineworkers to shop patrons, but perhaps most importantly, the
populations living in diamond-producing zones.

1

World Diamond Council. Press Release: Meeting At Annual Meeting, WDC Plenary expresses
support for widening 'conflict diamonds' description in KP Core Document. New York: World
Diamond Council, May 2012.
<http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/press/2012/WDC%20Press%20Release%20(C
oncluding%20Press%20Release%20of%208th%20WD%20Annual%20Meeting)%2014-52012.pdf>. World Diamond Council. World Diamond Council Board Sets Up Steering
Committee To Examine Restructuring, Reiterates Support For KP Reform And Expanded
Conflict Diamond Definition. New York: World Diamond Council, 12 July 2012.
<www.worlddiamondcouncil.com>. Global Witness. Return of the Blood Diamond, the deadly
race to control Zimbabwe’s new-found diamond wealth. London: Global Witness.
2010<http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/return_of_blood_diamond.pdf >
2

Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process, How NGOs Cleaned Up the Global
Diamond Industry. Burlington, VT. Ashgate, 2010. Kantz, C, ‘The Power of Socialization:
Engaging the Diamond Industry in the Kimberley Process’, Business and Politics 9, 3, 2010,
pp.1-20. Wright, C, ‘Tackling Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme',
International Peacekeeping 11,4, 2004, pp. 697-708.

3

Hughes T, ‘Conflict Diamonds and the Kimberley Process: Mission Accomplished-or Mission
Impossible?’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 13, 2, 2006, pp.115-130. Petrova A,
‘The Implementation and Effectiveness of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in the
United States’, The International Lawyer, 40, Winter 2006, pp. 945-960. Van Bockstael S & K
Vlassenroot, ‘From Conflict to Development Diamonds: The Kimberley Process, and Africa’s
Artisanal Diamond Mines’ Studia Diplomatica, VXII, 2, 2009, pp. 79-96.
4

Haufler V, ‘The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Governance
and Conflict Prevention’, Journal of Business Ethics, 89, 2010, pp. 403-416. Hilson G. & R
Maconachie, ‘Good Governance and the Extractive Industries in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Mineral
Processing & Extractive Metallurgy Review, 30, 2009, pp. 52-100.
5

Through the System of Warranties, a certificate of guarantee that diamonds are not sourced
from conflict zones and are in compliance with UN resolutions accompanies all invoices. The
certificate states ‘[t]he diamonds herein invoiced have been purchased from legitimate sources
not involved in funding conflict and in compliance with United Nations resolutions. The seller
hereby guarantees that these diamonds are conflict free, based on personal knowledge and/or
written guarantees provided by the supplier of these diamonds.’ All industry organizations and
their members have adopted a number of additional principles of self-regulations that include
that companies trading in rough and polished diamonds must keep records of the warranty
invoices received and issued and ensuring that all employees who buy or sell diamonds are well
informed about trade and government regulations restricting the trade in conflict diamonds.
Failure to follow these industry guidelines can result in expulsion from industry organizations or
even the inability to trade legally in diamonds According to Richard Harris, manager of Schreve
and Company, it is nearly impossible to receive a diamond from a cutter without documentation
regarding the diamond’s origins. For more information, see The Essential Guide to the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, New York: World Diamond Council 2003.
6

Partnership Africa Canada, and the governments of Canada and the United States. Diamonds
Without Borders, An Assessment of the Challenges of Implementing and Enforcing the KPCS, A
Report to the KPCS Plenary. Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, and the governments of
Canada and the United States. November 2010. Hughes, T, ‘Conflict Diamonds and the
Kimberley Process: Mission Accomplished-or Mission Impossible?’, South African Journal of
International Affairs, 13, 2, 2006, pp.115-130. Smilie, I, Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for
Reform. Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, June 2010.
7

Bieri F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process, How NGOs Cleaned Up the Global
Diamond Industry. Burlington, VT. Ashgate, 2010. Bieri F & J Boli, ‘Trading Diamonds
Responsibly: Institutional Explanations for Corporate Social Responsibility’ Sociological
Forum, 26, 3, 2011, pp. 501-526.
8

Hoffberth M et al., ‘Multinational Enterprises as “Social Actors”-Constructivist Explanations
for Corporate Social Responsibility’, Global Society, 25, 2, 2011, pp. 205-225. Ruggie J,

‘Reconstituting the Global Public Domain-Issues, Actors, and Practices’, European Journal of
International Relations. 10, 4, 2004, pp. 499-533.
9

Bieri F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process, How NGOs Cleaned Up the Global
Diamond Industry. Burlington, VT. Ashgate, 2010. Haufler V, ‘The Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Governance and Conflict Prevention’, Journal of
Business Ethics, 89, 2010, pp. 403-416. Kantz C, ‘The Power of Socialization: Engaging the
Diamond Industry in the Kimberley Process'. Business and Politics, 9, 3: 2007, pp. 1-20.
10

Pattberg P, ‘The Institutionalization of Private Governance: How Business and Nonprofit
Organizations Agree on Transnational Rules’ Governance: An International Journal of Policy,
Administration and Institutions. 18, 4, 2005, pp. 589-610, p. 594.
11

Ibid.

12

Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process, How NGOs Cleaned Up the Global
Diamond Industry. Burlington, VT. Ashgate, 2010.
13

Bain and Company The Global Diamond Industry, Portrait for Growth. Antwerp: Bain and
Company and Antwerp World Diamond Center Foundation, 2012, p. 2.
14

The main purpose of the WDC is to guide the diamond industry in its compliance with the
KPCS and in advancing additional voluntary standards to prevent the sale of conflict diamonds.
15

Ronit K & V Schneider, ‘Global Governance through Private Organizations’, Governance: An
International Journal of Policy and Administration. 12, 3, 1999, pp. 242-266, p. 255.
16

Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process, How NGOs Cleaned Up the Global
Diamond Industry. Burlington, VT. Ashgate, 2010.
17

Global Witness. Global Witness Leaves Kimberly Process, calls for diamond trade to be held
accountable. London: Global Witness. 5 December 2011
<http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-leaves-kimberley-process-calls-diamondtrade-be-held-accountable>
18

World Diamond Council. Press Release: Meeting At Annual Meeting, WDC Plenary expresses
support for widening 'conflict diamonds' description in KP Core Document. New York: World
Diamond Council, May 2012.
<http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/press/2012/WDC%20Press%20Release%20(C
oncluding%20Press%20Release%20of%208th%20WD%20Annual%20Meeting)%2014-52012.pdf>.
19

Haufler V, ‘The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global
Governance and Conflict Prevention’, Journal of Business Ethics, 89, 2010, pp. 403-416. Kantz

C, ‘The Power of Socialization: Engaging the Diamond Industry in the Kimberley Process'.
Business and Politics, 9, 3: 2007, pp. 1-20.
20

Hoffberth M et al., ‘Multinational Enterprises as “Social Actors”-Constructivist Explanations
for Corporate Social Responsibility’, Global Society, 25, 2, 2011, pp. 205-225, p. 211.
21

Eligon J, ‘Global Witness Quits Group on “Blood Diamonds”.’ New York Times, 5 December
2011.
22

Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Core Document. Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme, 2012. <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document>.
23

Global Witness. Return of the Blood Diamond, the deadly race to control Zimbabwe’s newfound diamond wealth. London: Global Witness. 2010.
<http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/return_of_blood_diamond.pdf >
24

Illicit diamonds additionally include those stolen or smuggled, undeclared for tax evasion,
used for money laundering and other crimes.
25

Amnesty International and Global Witness, Déjà vu, Diamond Industry Still Failing to Deliver
on Promises, London: Amnesty International and Global Witness, October 2004.
26

Ibid.

27

Kantz C, ‘The Power of Socialization: Engaging the Diamond Industry in the Kimberley
Process'. Business and Politics, 9, 3: 2007, pp. 1-20, p. 8
28

Portland is known as a liberal city within the United States (For example, in a 2005 Center for
Voting Research poll, Portland ranked no. 29 of 237 on the nation’s most liberal cities (with
populations over 100,000) list. Portland Business Journal 11 August 2005
http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2005/08/08/daily30.html. Portland also has more
unaffiliated voters than registered Republicans. The Oregonian, 6 May 2012 “Politics of Place:
A distinctive Liberalism Guides Low-Profile Portland Legislative Races” Jeff Mapes
http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/05/politics_of_place_a_distinctiv.html).
These two characteristics make Portland a good candidate for a survey on knowledge of
jewelers’ obligations under the KPCS and System of Warranties.
29

Amnesty International and Global Witness, Déjà vu, Diamond Industry Still Failing to Deliver
on Promises, London: Amnesty International and Global Witness, October 2004, p. 4.
30

Of those jewelers listed within the 2012/13 Yellowbook, only those with Portland addresses,
rather than addresses in surrounding towns and suburbs, were included. This was to confine the
pool of possible jewelers to Portland itself as it is noted that the further outside Portland you go,
the more mixed the political spectrum is30. Jewelers without an address were excluded. In
addition, only two branches of chain jewelry from two different parts of Portland were included

in the survey. Finally, any jeweler with the following words in its name was eliminated: "buyer"
"piercing" "auction" "body" "pawn" "loan" "exchange" "trade".
31

Two phrases were searched on the Google search engine: ‘diamond jewelry stores’ and ‘online
diamond retailers.’ From these searches, a list was generated from the first ten pages of results
for the first search and the first twenty pages of results from the second search
32

Different authors utilize the terms Multinational Corporations, Transnational Corporations,
and Multinational Enterprises to represent the same entities: those corporate actors that operate
across multiple states and that often operate outside international governance structures.
33

Fritsch S, ‘The UN Global Compact and the Global Governance of Corporate Social
Responsibility: Complex Multilateralism for a More Human Globalisation?’, Global Society 22,
1, 2008, pp. 1-26.
34

Fritsch S, ‘The UN Global Compact and the Global Governance of Corporate Social
Responsibility: Complex Multilateralism for a More Human Globalisation?’, Global Society 22,
1, 2008, pp. 1-26. Palacios J, ‘Corporate Citizenship and Social Responsibility in a Globalized
World’, Citizenship Studies, 8, 4, 2004, pp. 383-402.
35

Palacios J, ‘Corporate Citizenship and Social Responsibility in a Globalized World’,
Citizenship Studies, 8, 4, 2004, pp. 383-402, p. 398.
36

Haufler V, ‘The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global
Governance and Conflict Prevention’, Journal of Business Ethics, 89, 2010, pp. 403-416, p. 41314, p. 410.
37

Haufler V, ‘The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global
Governance and Conflict Prevention’, Journal of Business Ethics, 89, 2010, pp. 403-416, p. 404.
38

Bieri F & J Boli, ‘Trading Diamonds Responsibly: Institutional Explanations for Corporate
Social Responsibility’ Sociological Forum, 26, 3, 2011, pp. 501-526, p. 505.
39

Ruggie J, ‘Reconstituting the Global Public Domain-Issues, Actors, and Practices’, European
Journal of International Relations. 10, 4, 2004, pp. 499-533. p. 518.
40

Haufler V, ‘The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global
Governance and Conflict Prevention’, Journal of Business Ethics, 89, 2010, pp. 403-416, p. 41314.
41

Palacios J, ‘Corporate Citizenship and Social Responsibility in a Globalized World’,
Citizenship Studies, 8, 4, 2004, pp. 383-402, p. 398-99.
42

See, for example, Smilie, I. Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform. Ottawa:
Partnership Africa Canada, June 2010 and Gooch, C. Why we are leaving the Kimberley

Process-A message from Global Witness Founding Director Charmian Gooch. Global Witness
Press Release, 5 December 2001.
43

Ian Smilie withdrew from Partnership Africa Canada over Marange, stating that “African
governments, particularly South Africa, seem completely unwilling to challenge Zimbabwe.”
See McClearn M, ‘Blood Diamonds are forever’, Canadian Business, 83,13/14, 2010, pp. 59-65.
Zimbabwe also argued that the NGOs should be kicked out of the KPCS meetings for
interference in state affairs. See ‘Eject civic NGOs from the KPCS’, The Herald, 2 October
2011, http://www.herald.co.zw/eject-civic-ngos-from-the-kpcs/ .
44

Izhakoff E, Kimberley Process is a Means to Sustainable Development. Speech to the
Intercessional Meeting of the Kimberly Process. Washington, D.C. 4 June 2012.
<http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/system/files/documents/2012%20Plenary%20Izhakoff%2
0Opening%20Speech.pdf>
45

Izhakoff E, Kimberley Process serves both consumers and producing nations,
says Eli Izhakoff to WDC Annual Meeting in Tel Aviv. Speech to the World Diamond Council
Annual Meeting. Tel Aviv. 6 May 2013.
<http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/press/2013/WDC%20Press%20Release%20%20Text%20of%20WDC%20President's%20address%20(6-5-2013).pdf>
46

Milovanovic G, KP Chair Updates Vision Statement, Seeks Comment By Aug. 24 Speech to
the Intercessional Meeting of the KPCS, 10 August 2012.
<http://www.diamonds.net/News/NewsItem.aspx?ArticleID=40843&ArticleTitle=KP+Chair+Up
dates+Vision+Statement%2C+Seeks+Comment+By+Aug.+24>
47

Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Final Communique, Johannesburg: Kimberley
Process Plenary Meeting, 22 November 2013.
<http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/system/files/documents/Johannesburg%20Plenary%20Co
mmunique%202013.pdf>
48

Mangudhla T, ‘Zimbabwe: Kimberly Process Conflict Diamond Debate Mounts’, Zimbabwe
Independent, 10 May 2013. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201305101338.html>
49

Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Final Communique. Washington, D.C.: Kimberley
Process Plenary Meeting. 30 November 2012.
<http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/Jan%202013/Kimberley%20Process%202012%20Washingt
on%20Declaration.pdf>
50

Hoffberth M et al., ‘Multinational Enterprises as “Social Actors”-Constructivist Explanations
for Corporate Social Responsibility’, Global Society, 25, 2, 2011, pp. 205-225, p. 217.
51

Fritsch S, ‘The UN Global Compact and the Global Governance of Corporate Social
Responsibility: Complex Multilateralism for a More Human Globalisation?’, Global Society 22,

1, 2008, pp. 1-26. Palacios J, ‘Corporate Citizenship and Social Responsibility in a Globalized
World’, Citizenship Studies, 8, 4, 2004, pp. 383-402.
52

Smilie, I, Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform. Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada,
June 2010.
53

In 2011, 124 million carats of rough diamonds valued at $15 billion were mined. Once out of
the ground, the rough stones moved through the diamond pipeline—a value chain that runs from
dealers to cutters and polishers to jewelry manufacturers to retail stores and consumers. The
value-added along the way is impressive, as $15 billion in rough diamonds becomes $24 billion
in polished diamonds, which in turn goes into diamond jewelry with a resulting retail value of
$71 billion. Bain and Company, The Global Diamond Industry, Portrait for Growth. Antwerp:
Bain and Company and Antwerp World Diamond Center Foundation, 2012, pg. 4.
54

Bain and Company The Global Diamond Industry, Portrait for Growth. Antwerp: Bain and
Company and Antwerp World Diamond Center Foundation, 2012.
55

Diamonds in the Rough Human Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe,
New York : Human Rights Watch, 2009.
56

Bieri F & J Boli, ‘Trading Diamonds Responsibly: Institutional Explanations for Corporate
Social Responsibility’ Sociological Forum, 26, 3, 2011, pp. 501-526, p. 504.

